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STRECHING THE DISPUTE SETTLEMENT
UNDERSTANDING: U.S.—COTTON’S RELAXED
INTERPRETATION OF CROSS-RETALIATION
IN THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION
David J. Townsend*
I. INTRODUCTION
In August 2009, the World Trade Organization (“WTO”) au-
thorized Brazil to impose sanctions against the United States for its
continued subsidization of cotton producers1 in violation of the WTO
Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (“SCM Agree-
* The author worked on the Senate Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition and For-
estry from 2004–2006 for then ranking-Democratic Member, Senator Tom Harkin
(D-IA).  The author holds a master of science (MSc) from the London School of
Economics in international political economy and a B.A. in political science and
sociology from the University of Minnesota.
1 Decision by the Arbitrator, United States — Subsidies on Upland Cotton — Re-
course to Arbitration by the United States Under Article  22.6 of the DSU and Arti-
cle 4.11 of the SCM Agreement, WT/DS267/ARB/1 (Aug. 31, 2009) [hereinafter U.S.
– Cotton or U.S. — Cotton (4.11)]; see also Decision by the Arbitrator, United
States — Recourse to Arbitration by the United States Under Article 22.6 of the
DSU and Article 7.10 of the SCM Agreement, WT/DS267/ARB/2 (Aug. 31, 2009).
These reports are collectively referred to as U.S.—Cotton in this paper.  Section V
of both reports, on cross-retaliation, are identical, including paragraph numbering.
The reports differ in that WT/D267/ARB/1 concerns retaliation for U.S. export
credit guarantees and Step-2 payments (prohibited subsidies under the SCM) and
WT/D267/ARB/2 concerns retaliation for U.S. Marketing Loan (ML) and
Countercyclical payments (CC) (actionable subsidies under the SCM). See U.S. —
Cotton, supra, ¶ 1.27-31 (discussing why the WTO issued two separate reports).  I
refer in the main body and footnote text to the U.S.—Cotton case to denote the
entire U.S. — Brazil dispute over cotton subsidies.  In citations, any reference to
U.S.—Cotton is limited to the arbitrator’s decision in August 2009, as cited in this
footnote.  Where cited as U.S. — Cotton (4.11), this refers only to the report on
prohibited subsidies.  The Arbitrator held in these cases that Brazil could only
cross-retaliate under non-GATT agreements if Brazil’s damages exceed $409.7
million on an annual basis, and also found that the annual damages accruing to
Brazil in this case were only $294.7 million, U.S .— Cotton, ¶¶ 5.183, 5.201, 6.1-
6.5.  Following the report, however, Brazil has sought to demonstrate its current
damages exceed the arbitrator’s calculations and would therefore allow cross-re-
taliation, see Erik Wasson, USTR Under Pressure to Bring Cotton Compliance
Panel After Ruling, 27 INSIDE U.S. TRADE No. 34, Sept. 4, 2009 (saying that Brazil
and U.S. farm groups believe the current figure “will likely be much higher when
newer data is used”).
135
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ment”)2 and the Agreement on Agriculture.3  The WTO approved Bra-
zil’s use of sanctions outside the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade (“GATT”),4 authorizing cross-retaliation against rights owed to
the United States under the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of
Intellectual Property Rights (“TRIPS”).5  This is the third case of cross-
retaliation authorized by a WTO arbitrator6 under the Understanding
on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes
(DSU).7
This paper considers when the WTO should permit cross-retali-
ation, which allows members to impose sanctions against the violating
state outside of the WTO agreement where the violation took place.8
This paper provides evidence suggesting that the threat of cross-retali-
ation would not have changed Congress’ or the executive’s reaction to
the U.S.—Cotton case and that the WTO’s emphasis on inducing com-
pliance through cross-retaliation is misplaced.  This paper argues that
cross-retaliation under the DSU is most plausibly read  to be limited to
situations where only small amounts of goods, services, or intellectual
property are exported from the violating state.  The U.S. — Cotton de-
2 Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, Apr. 15, 1994, Mar-
rakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1A, Legal
Instruments — Results of the Uruguay Round, 1867 U.N.T.S. 14 (1994) [hereinaf-
ter SCM Agreement], available at http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/24-
scm.pdf.
3 Agreement on Agriculture, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing
the World Trade Organization, Annex 1A, Legal Instruments — Results of the
Uruguay Round, 1867 U.N.T.S. 410 (1994), available at http://www.wto.org/
english/docs_e/legal_e/14-ag.pdf.
4 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1847, 61 Stat. A-11, 55
U.N.T.S. 194 [hereinafter GATT]; see U.S. – Cotton, supra note 1.
5 Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15,
1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex
1C, Legal Instruments — Results of the Uruguay Round, 33 I.L.M. 1197 (1994)
[hereinafter TRIPS]; see U.S. – Cotton, supra note 1.
6 The other two cases are: Decision by the Arbitrator, United States — Measures
Affecting the Cross-Border Supply of Gambling and Betting Services — Recourse to
Arbitration by the United States under Article 22.6 of the DSU, WT/DS285/ARB
(Dec. 21, 2007) [hereinafter U.S. — Gambling]; and Decision by the Arbitrators,
European Communities — Regime for the Importation, Sale and Distribution of
Bananas — Recourse to Arbitration by the European Communities Under Article
22.6 of the DSU, WT/DS27/ARB/ECU (Mar. 24, 2000) [hereinafter E.C. —
Bananas].
7 Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes,
Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization,
Annex 2, Legal Instruments — Results of the Uruguay Round, 33 I.L.M. 1226
(1994) [hereinafter DSU].
8 Id. art. 22.3.
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cision allowing cross-retaliation where Brazil imports significant
amounts of American goods therefore stretches the DSU to a legally
distorted position.  In short, this paper argues that: (1) legally, the
DSU is better understood to preclude cross-retaliation on the facts of
the U.S. — Cotton case; and (2) politically, cross-retaliation is unlikely
to induce greater compliance with WTO obligations in many cases.
Overall, this paper advocates a greater reliance on the level of trade
between the countries in determining whether cross-retaliation is
appropriate.
This paper proceeds as follows:  Part II provides an overview of
the DSU and the legal standard for cross-retaliation established under
DSU Article 22.3.  Part III examines the most recent ruling concerning
cross-retaliation under DSU Article 22.3 and demonstrates that the
U.S. — Cotton case relaxes the cross-retaliation legal standard.  It ar-
gues that WTO arbitrators should focus more on the level of trade be-
tween the members in the dispute.  Part IV examines the American
response to the U.S. — Cotton case and shows that the threat of cross-
retaliation was unlikely to induce the United States to change certain
farm programs in order to comply with WTO rulings.  Part V concludes
with cautionary remarks concerning the use of retaliation under the
WTO more broadly.
II. CROSS-RETALIATION UNDER DSU ARTICLE 22.3
A. DSU Article 22.3 in its Context and in Light of the DSU’s Object
and Purpose
The DSU both constrains and enables states to retaliate under
the WTO.  The DSU authorizes cross-retaliation aimed at inducing
compliance from the violating state.  At the same time, the DSU con-
strains retaliatory actions by limiting the size of retaliation and estab-
lishing procedures that must be followed before cross-retaliation is
permissible.  This section argues that retaliation under the DSU arti-
cle should be read as having broader goals than simply inducing
compliance.
When a WTO member violates trade obligations and fails to
comply with rulings that find its domestic measures to be illegal under
the WTO, DSU Articles 22 and 3 require victim states to pursue a hier-
archy of remedies against a violating state before retaliating.9  The hi-
erarchy starts with requiring an effort by members to reach a
“mutually acceptable” solution, which is “clearly . . . preferred.”10  Next
in the hierarchy is for the violating state to compensate the victim
9 Id. arts. 3, 22.
10 Id. art. 3.7.  DSU Article 22.2 requires members to first enter into negotiations
to find a mutually acceptable solution until a reasonable period of time has ex-
\\server05\productn\R\RGL\9-2\RGL201.txt unknown Seq: 4 16-APR-10 10:36
138 RICHMOND JOURNAL OF GLOBAL LAW & BUSINESS [Vol. 9:2
state.11  Compensation must be accorded on a most-favored-nation ba-
sis and thus is rarely used.12  As a “last resort,” Article 3 allows states
to “suspend [ ] . . . concessions”13 (the WTO’s term of art for retalia-
tion)14 that would otherwise be owed to the violating state under WTO
agreements.
Retaliation under the WTO requires following the procedures
established in DSU Article 22.3.15  A state must suspend concessions
within the same sector or agreement,16 unless doing so “is not practi-
cable or effective.”17  If not practicable or effective, and the victim state
considers “circumstances are serious enough,” it may cross-retaliate by
seeking to suspend trade concessions in other WTO agreements.18
DSU Article 22.3(d) provides factors to consider in suspending conces-
sions across agreements; including trade under the agreement, the im-
portance of that trade to the complaining party, and “the broader
economic elements related to the nullification or impairment and the
pired, plus 20 days, for the violating state to bring its law into compliance with
WTO obligations, see  id. art. 22.2.
11 See id. arts. 3.7, 22.2.
12 KEVIN KENNEDY, INTERNATIONAL TRADE REGULATION: READINGS, CASES, NOTES
AND PROBLEMS 43 (2009) (arguing that the MFN requirement for compensation
has “effectively gutted compensation as a remedy”).  A recent example of such com-
pensation is new concessions given to the EU following the U.S. — Gambling deci-
sion, see Public Citizen Warns of Error in U.S.-EU Gambling Compensation Deal,”
27 INSIDE U.S. TRADE, No. 26 (July 3, 2009) (discussing legal problems with the
compensation and its relation to the U.S. — Gambling case).
13 DSU, supra note 7, art. 3.7.
14 World Trade Organization, Hong Kong WTO Ministerial 2005: Briefing Notes,
http://www.wto.org/english/theWTO_e/minist_e/min05_e/brief_e/brief10_e.htm
(stating that to “suspend concessions” under the DSU is also known as “to retali-
ate”); see Steve Charnovitz, Rethinking WTO Trade Sanctions, 95 AM. J. INT’L L.
792, 805–08 (2001) (discussing how the term “sanctions” came to be used in WTO
commentary instead of “suspension of concessions”).
15 See DSU, supra note 7, art. 1 (explaining the scope of the DSU).
16 DSU Article 22.3(a)-(b) requires retaliation within the same “sector(s)” or the
“same agreement” unless it is impracticable or ineffective, DSU, supra note 7, art.
22.3(a)-(b).  Sector is defined under DSU Article 22.3(f).  For goods, sector means
all goods, id. art. 22.3(f)(i).  For the cases considered here, the distinction between
sector and agreement is irrelevant.  I refer in this paper to cross-retaliation under
the same “agreement,” but it is important to note that in some circumstances,
states must first show ineffectiveness and impracticability within the same sector
before considering whether they can retaliate more broadly within the same
agreement.
17 Id. art. 22.3(b)-(c) (emphasis added).
18 Id. art. 22.3(c).  WTO arbitrators have deferred to the complaining state’s as-
sessment that the circumstances were serious enough to cross-retaliate. See U.S.
– Cotton, supra note 1, ¶ 5.217; U.S. — Gambling, supra note 6, ¶ 4.113; E.C. —
Bananas, supra note 6, ¶¶ 126–27.
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broader economic consequences of the suspension of concessions or
other obligations.”19  Compliance with these procedures is subject to
review by WTO arbitrators.20 The text of DSU Article 22.3 therefore
establishes the practicable and effective standard and the context of
DSU Article 22.3 establishes the hierarchy of remedies.  WTO arbitra-
tors have looked to the broader purpose of retaliation under the DSU
to give the practicable and effective standard greater clarity.21
WTO agreements are interpreted according to customary inter-
national law,22 including analyzing treaty text in its context and in
light of the treaty’s object and purpose.23  Much of the DSU supports
the proposition that its purpose is to induce violating states to remove
offending measures.24  The DSU provides that the “first objective”
when a member is in violation of obligations is “to secure the with-
drawal of the measures concerned.”25  The DSU also provides that
sanctions are “temporary measures,”26 used as a “last resort”27 when a
member obstinately refuses to comply with its WTO obligations.  The
overarching purpose of the DSU is ensuring predictable results within
19 DSU, supra note 7, art. 22.3(d)(i)-(ii).
20 Id. art. 22.3; see U.S. — Cotton, supra note 1, ¶¶ 5.50–51; U.S. — Gambling,
supra note 6, ¶ 2.16; E.C. – Bananas, supra note 6, ¶¶ 50, 51.  The DSU might be
read to preclude a probing analysis by WTO arbitrators of a complaining member’s
choice of retaliation in light of its references to, for example, whether a party “con-
siders that it is not practicable or effective” to impose sanctions within the same
sector or agreement, DSU, supra note 7, art. 22.3(a)-(b) (emphasis added).  Addi-
tionally, the arbitrators review “shall not examine the nature of the concessions or
other obligations to be suspended but shall determine whether the level of such sus-
pension is equivalent to the level of nullification or impairment,” DSU supra note 7,
art. 22.7 (emphasis added).  This suggests that these terms may have been in-
tended to be self-defining by the complaining member.  WTO arbitrators have
found authority to review adherence to the DSU procedures in Article 22.3 by cit-
ing their obligation under DSU Articles 22.6 and 22.7 to evaluate compliance with
the DSU procedures, U.S. — Cotton, supra note 1, ¶¶ 5.50–51; U.S. — Gambling,
supra note 6, ¶ 2.16.; E.C. — Bananas, supra note 6, ¶¶ 50–51.
21 See U.S. — Cotton, supra note 1, ¶¶ 5.81; U.S. — Gambling, supra note 6, ¶
4.29; E.C. – Bananas, supra note 6, ¶¶ 72, 76.
22 See DSU, supra note 7, art. 3.2 (specifying that a purpose of the DSU is to “pre-
serve the rights and obligations of Members. . .in accordance with customary rules
of interpretation of public international law.”).
23 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 31, opened for signature May
23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 [hereinafter Vienna Convention].
24 See DSU, supra note 7, art. 3.7.
25 Id.
26 Id. art. 22.1.
27 Id. art. 3.7.
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the multilateral trading system and to “preserve the rights and obliga-
tions of Members.”28
WTO arbitrators considering the question have concluded that
the object and purpose of the cross-retaliation is indeed to induce com-
pliance from the violating member.29  In the WTO arbitrators’ views,
inducing compliance imbues the meaning of DSU Article 22.3 proce-
dures, including what it means to be practicable or effective to suspend
obligations within the affected agreement rather than employing
cross-retaliation.30  This view is supported by experts in WTO law.31
Given the textual support of such a reading, it seems clear that
the DSU aims to induce the violating state to remove the offending
measure.  It is, however, not the exclusive purpose of the DSU.  The
DSU also constrains state responses toward the violating state, princi-
pally by limiting the level of retaliation “equivalent to the level of the
nullification.”32  If inducing compliance from the violating state were
the only goal, the DSU would approve retaliating as much as neces-
sary to achieve this outcome.33  Therefore, an equally plausible read-
28 Id. art. 3.2.
29 U.S. — Cotton, supra note 1, ¶ 5.81; U.S. — Gambling, supra note 6, ¶ 2.7
(noting that while retaliation aims at inducing compliance, it is limited by level of
retaliation); see E.C. — Bananas, supra note 6, ¶¶ 72, 76.
30 See E.C. — Bananas, supra note 6, ¶¶ 70–79; U.S. — Gambling, supra note 6,
¶¶ 4.29–31.
31 See John H. Jackson & Carlos M. Va´zquez, Some Reflections on Compliance
with WTO Dispute Settlement Decisions, 33 LAW & POL’Y INT’L BUS. 555, 562–66
(2002) (discussing various purposes of the DSU, including inducing compliance
with underlying trade obligations); see also Charnovitz, supra note 14, at 804
(“[t]he tenor of these provision [the DSU] is that a suspension operates to drive
compliance”). But see Warren F. Schwartz & Alan O. Sykes, The Economic Struc-
ture of Renegotiation and Dispute Resolution in the World Trade Organization, 31
J. LEGAL STUD. §179, 189 (2002) (arguing that the WTO members are not obliged
to comply with rulings, but may compensate the victim under the DSU if the vio-
lating state is “willing to pay that price”).
32 DSU, supra note 7, art. 22.4.  The size of retaliation against subsidies is defined
slightly differently.  Under the SCM, members may impose “appropriate counter-
measures” in response to prohibited subsides.  SCM Agreement, supra note 2, art.
4.10.  In response to actionable subsidies, Members may impose retaliation “com-
mensurate with the degree and nature of the adverse effects determined to exist.”
SCM Agreement, supra note 2, art. 7.9.  The Arbitrator in US—Cotton emphasized
that SCM Article 4.10 gives greater “flexibility” in determining the size of counter-
measures, although all three take into consideration the trade effects from the
illegal measure. See U.S.—Cotton (4.11), supra note 1, ¶¶ 4.95–107.
33 Thomas Sebastian, World Trade Organization Remedies and the Assessment of
Proportionality: Equivalence and Appropriateness, 48 HARV. INT’L L.J. 337, 365–66
(2007) (inducing compliance as the purpose of the DSU “is difficult to reconcile
with the limitations on the intensity and form of retaliation set out in Article 22”).
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ing of DSU Article 22.3 is that it seeks to limit and define the scope
and substance of retaliation.
The DSU performs a “non-escalation” function, preventing rap-
idly escalating trade wars.34  It does so by precluding retaliation by
non-parties to a case.35 Such retaliation undermines the compliance
objective because the injury for violating WTO obligations runs to
many WTO members.36
The DSU also strives to provide “security and predictability” to
disputes and to “clarify the existing” obligations of members under the
WTO.37  This suggests that the DSU clarifies the precise contours of
legal obligations38 and could be undermined by liberal use of retalia-
tion against members for breaches of WTO obligations.
Finally, the DSU procedures might also be read as a political
“safety valve,”39 allowing breach of obligations under the WTO with
certainty as to the cost of such breaches.40  The United States argued
in the U.S. — Cotton case that the DSU’s purpose was rebalancing the
bargain under the WTO agreements by compensating victim states at
a level equal to the injury caused by the violating state.41  This concept
34 Id. at 378–80; see also Jackson & Va´zquez, supra note 31, at 562 (arguing that
parts of the DSU suggest “that its purpose may be simply to afford a peaceful
mechanism for settling individual disputes.”).
35 See DSU, supra note 7, art. 23.1 (“[w]hen Members seek the redress of a viola-
tion of obligations. . .they shall have recourse to, and abide by, the rules and proce-
dures of this Understanding.”).
36 See id. (“[w]hen Members seek the redress of a violation of obligations. . .they
shall have recourse to, and abide by, the rules and procedures of this Understand-
ing.”) (emphasis added); id. art. 22.3 (making the DSU the exclusive way to seek
retaliation under the WTO).
37 Id. art. 3.2.
38 See Jackson & Va´zquez, supra note 31, at 563.
39 Charnovitz, supra note 14, at 818.
40 See id. at 820 (seeing the DSU as a political safeguard puts it in “a more chari-
table light” than reading it as a sanction aimed at inducing compliance).
41 See Written Submission of the United States, United States — Subsidies on
Upland Cotton: Arbitration Under Article 22.6 of the DSU and Article 4.11 of the
SCM Agreement, United States — Subsidies on Upland Cotton: Arbitration Under
Article 22.6 of the DSU and Article 7.10 of the SCM Agreement, WT/DS267, at ¶¶
339–41  (Dec. 9, 2008) [hereinafter U.S. Submission to the Arbitrator], available at
http://www.ustr.gov/webfm_send/572 (“[t]ailoring countermeasures to what is
most likely to promote compliance invites Members to act disproportionately”); see
also  Schwartz & Sykes, supra note 31, at §181 (arguing the DSU deters “ineffi-
cient breach” of WTO obligations by limiting retaliation).
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is controversial and has been rejected by commentators42 and, implic-
itly, by WTO arbitrators’ reliance on inducing compliance.43
Retaliation under the DSU is most plausibly read as enabling
state retaliation, but also as constraining such a response.  This dual-
purpose understanding of the DSU is supported by the historical and
legal context within which the DSU was adopted.
B. Placing the DSU Within Historical and International Legal
Perspective
It is useful to contextualize the DSU remedies by looking at
traditional remedies under international law and the pre-WTO GATT,
as well as by examining the negotiating history of the DSU.44  The
DSU lies between the baseline of international legal remedies, which
allow significantly greater compensation for breach of treaties, and
GATT remedies, which were effectively non-existent because violating
states could prevent their approval.  When considered in light of its
negotiating history and the international law of remedies, the DSU
should be understood equally as constraining state retaliation as ena-
bling it.  By institutionalizing retaliation, treaty-makers allowed retal-
iation, but only in limited circumstances.
Post-World War II treaty makers created the GATT and its
later-aborted institutional companion, the International Trade Organ-
ization (“ITO”), as a means to avoid the beggar-thy-neighbor policies
that plagued the interwar years of the 1930s.45  In crafting a trade
regime premised on reciprocity and non-discrimination, post-war plan-
42 See Jackson & Va´zquez, supra note 31, at 563–65 (arguing that rebalancing
function undermines predictability and “conflates the primary obligations imposed
on the members by the covered agreements and the secondary obligations pro-
vided for in the DSU” by effectively redefining the primary obligations); Sebastian,
supra note 33, at 371 (asserting that this reading of the WTO asks DSU arbitra-
tors to “rewrite the WTO agreements between the two WTO Member states”); See
supra text accompanying notes 29–31.
43 See supra note 29.
44 The materials considered in this section are an appropriate way to confirm the
meaning of DSU Article 22.3.  The Vienna Convention allows considering “prepar-
atory work of the treaty and the circumstances of its conclusion, in order to con-
firm the meaning resulting from the application of article 31, or to determine the
meaning when interpretation according to article 31: (a) leaves the meaning am-
biguous or obscure. . . .” Vienna Convention, supra note 23, art. 32.
45 See ROBERT E. HUDEC, THE GATT LEGAL SYSTEM AND WORLD TRADE DIPLO-
MACY, 6 (2d ed. 1990) (in describing the historical lesson of the interwar years,
“[g]overnments in their desperation had experimented with many new and gener-
ally worse forms of trade restrictions.”); cf. Meredith A. Crowley, An Introduction
to the WTO and GATT, 17 J. ECON. PERSPECTIVES 42, at 44–47 (2003) (describing
how the WTO helps states avoid a prisoners dilemma where, although individually
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ners sought a legal mechanism to avoid disproportionate and uncon-
strained responses to a member’s protectionist policies.46  The pre-
GATT legal regime was characterized by states having, and often exer-
cising, unbridled discretion to raise barriers against one another.
The GATT, by contrast, effectively precluded trade retaliation
as a multilateral remedy.  Authorized retaliation under the GATT was
almost non-existent because the violating state could veto any ruling
adverse to it.47  This resulted in only one case of actual retaliation
under GATT.48  The WTO’s DSU eliminates these problems by auto-
matically establishing panels.49  The DSU allows appellate review of
alleged violations and the adoption of rulings unless the Dispute Set-
tlement Body (“DSB”) unanimously rejects a panel or appellate re-
port.50  Similarly, arbitrator reports are “final” and adopted by the
DSB unless unanimously rejected.51
The negotiating context of DSU also suggests states were
equally concerned with both enabling and limiting the scope and kind
of retaliation possible under the DSU.  The United States sought to
preclude WTO panels from authorizing compensation for past injury—
a practice that GATT panels allowed in retaliation for GATT-inconsis-
tent U.S. antidumping duties.52  Developing countries were concerned
about the numerous new trade obligations contained in the WTO, in-
cluding under GATS and TRIPS.53  Countries were also concerned
about  the increasing use of unilateral sanctions, particularly U.S.
sanctions under Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974.54  To address
rational to impose tariffs, it is collectively more efficient to coordinate open trade
policies).
46 See HUDEC, supra note 45, at 7 (stating that to avoid repeats of the interwar
period, obligations were required “in binding form” that would “be looked after by
a more permanent institution.”). JOHN H. JACKSON, THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM,
at 31 (1997) (MIT Press 1989) (describing the post-war consensus concerning the
“importance of establishing postwar economic institutions that would prevent
these mistakes from happening again.”).
47 Sebastian, supra note 33, at 345.
48 See Netherlands Measure of Suspension of Obligations to the United States
(Nov. 8, 1952), GATT B.I.S.D. (1st Supp.) at 32 (1953) (authorizing retaliations
against U.S. wheat for GATT obligations breached by section 104 of the Defense
Production Act).
49 DSU, supra note 7, art. 6.
50 Id. arts. 16–17.
51 Id. art. 22.7.
52 Petros C. Mavroidis, Remedies in the WTO Legal System: Between a Rock and a
Hard Place, 11 EUR. J. INT’L L. 763, 789–90 (2000).
53 See Sebastian, supra note 33, at 347–49.
54 See Schwartz & Sykes, supra note 31, at §198–200, 201–02.
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these concerns, the DSU limited retaliation to a level equivalent of the
obligation suspended and barred compensation for past harm.55
The context of the WTO negotiations suggests that DSU Article
22.3 itself was a compromise both to enable and inhibit cross-retalia-
tion.  The proponents of TRIPS in Uruguay Round negotiations intro-
duced the concept of the right to cross-retaliate and argued it was
necessary to ensure a remedy under the DSU where the violating
country exported no intellectual property to the developed countries,
and thus there was nothing to retaliate against.56  Negotiators agreed
to permit cross-retaliation but limited it through the DSU’s procedures
in Article 22.3.57  Thus, while states may impose sanctions against a
55 Compare DSU, supra note 7, art. 22.4 (providing for suspension “equivalent to
the level of nullification or impairment”), with GATT, supra note 4, art. XXIII(2)
(allowing for retaliation “appropriate in the circumstances”); see also Schwartz &
Sykes, supra note 31, at § 204 (concluding the DSU resulted from “the danger of
excessive unilateral sanctions that exists in the absence of centralized oversight
regarding the magnitude of sanctions.”); Sebastian, supra note 33, at 347–48.  The
United States argued in U.S. — Cotton that the DSU should not be interpreted as
focused on compliance, see U.S. Submission to the Arbitrator, supra note 41, ¶ 341
(arguing that inducing compliance is beyond the legal mandate of DSU arbitra-
tors). Compensation for past injury was rejected in U.S. — Cotton, U.S. —Cotton,
supra note 1, ¶ 3.62 (holding that Brazil may not seek countermeasures in retalia-
tion for laws found to violate WTO obligations but subsequently removed).  Peter
Mavroidis argues that this is not the correct conclusion concerning the scope of
remedies under the DSU, Mavroidis, supra note 52, at 790.
56 See JOHN CROOME, RESHAPING THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM: A HISTORY OF THE
URUGUAY ROUND 244, 112–14, 279–83 (2d ed. 1999) (summarizing cross-retalia-
tion in the DSU negotiations as “implied” by the TRIPS agreement and agreed to
by those who did not support it because it was an important “bargaining chip” in
DSU negotiations); see also Andrew L. Stoler, The WTO Dispute Settlement Pro-
cess: Did the Negotiators Get What They Wanted?, 3 WORLD TRADE REV. 99, 103–04
(2004) (noting that cross-retaliation was a “specific objective” of the United
States). But see Sebastian, supra note 33, at 348 (saying that developing countries
viewed cross-retaliation as a way to “limit the enforceability” of the new WTO obli-
gations).  The broader negotiating history of the DSU suggests other countries
strongly objected to unilateral imposition of U.S. sanctions and that the right to
cross-retaliate, presumably under TRIPS, would hurt developing countries be-
cause revoking rights in other agreements would most likely be under TRIPS, see
generally CROOME, supra, at 112–14, 126–29.  This suggests cross-retaliation was
contemplated only in rare circumstances: where retaliation within the same agree-
ment was impossible because the violating state exported nothing under the
agreement, the victim state could cross-retaliate to ensure it had a remedy under
the DSU.
57 Stoler, supra note 56, at 105 (distinguishing between affirming cross-retaliation
permitted under the DSU, which was a goal for developed countries, and the limits
of cross-retaliation in DSU Article 22.3, which were a “victory” for developing
countries); see CROOME, supra note 56, at 279–83.
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violating state, the DSU carefully limits the size and scope of permissi-
ble sanctions.
The DSU also stands in contrast to traditional compensation
for wrongs against states under the international law of state respon-
sibility.  Under international law, a state is under an obligation to
cease the violating actions.58  This is consistent with the DSU which
aims “to secure the withdrawal of the measures concerned if these are
found to be inconsistent”59 with WTO obligations.  Unlike the WTO,
however, the international law of state responsibility calls for compen-
sation for past damages caused by the violating state.60  The U.N. In-
ternational Law Commission points to the Permanent Court for
International Justice’s decision in Factory at Chorzow as establishing
the right to compensation for past wrongs in international law: “[t]he
essential principle . . . is that reparation must, so far as possible, wipe
out all the consequences of the illegal act and reestablish the situation
which would, in all probability, have existed if the act had not been
committed.”61  Unlike the international law requirement to compen-
58 Report of the International Law Commission to the General Assembly, Draft Ar-
ticles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, With Commen-
taries, 56 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 10) at 26, U.N. Doc A/56/10, reprinted in [2001] 2
Y.B. Int’l L. Comm’n 241, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/2001, art. 30, [hereinafter ILC
Draft Articles], available at http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/
commentaries/9_6_2001.pdf (“[t]he State responsible for the internationally wrong-
ful act is under an obligation: (a) to cease that act, if it is continuing . . .”).
59 DSU, supra note 7, art. 3.7.
60 ILC Draft Articles, supra note 58, art. 31.  Article 31, entitled “[r]eparation”
says that states are responsible “to make full reparation for the injury caused by
the internationally wrongful act,” id.; see RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELA-
TIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 901 (1987) (“[u]nder international law, a state
that has violated a legal obligation to another state is required to terminate the
violation and, ordinarily, to make reparation, including in appropriate circum-
stances restitution or compensation for loss or injury.”).  Comment e of the Re-
statement provides that interest on compensation “is generally payable from the
date of the injury to the date of the payment,” RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN
RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 901 cmt. e (1987).  Article 35 of the Inter-
national Law Commission’s Draft Articles similarly states that when one state
breaches its international obligations, the violating state’s duty to provide repara-
tions includes an obligation to “re-establish the situation which existed before the
wrongful act was committed,” ILC Draft Articles, supra note 58, art. 35.
61 Factory at Chorzow, The Merits, (F.R.G v. Pol.) 1928 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 17, at
47 (Sept. 13) (emphasis added); see ILC Draft Articles, supra note 58, art. 31 cmt. 2
(citing Factory at Chorzow, The Merits, (F.R.G v. Pol.) 1928 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No.
13, at 47 (Sept. 13)).  The Arbitrator cited the ILC’s Draft Articles in U.S. — Cot-
ton for the proposition that the sole purpose of countermeasures is to induce com-
pliance. See U.S. — Cotton (4.11), supra note 1, ¶ 4.113.  The Draft Articles
approve of countermeasures designed to address continued violations (permissible
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sate for the loss of a state’s expectation interest, under the WTO, once
the offending measure is removed, the matter is considered resolved
and becomes non-actionable under the DSU.62
WTO negotiators thus opted out of customary international le-
gal remedies and changed the status quo from the limited remedies
available under GATT.  The DSU is best viewed in this context as a
carefully balanced agreement to limit protectionist impulses in trade
law, while allowing effective WTO remedies.
III. THE EVOLVING STANDARD FOR CROSS-RETALIATION
UNDER WTO ARBITRATION
WTO arbitrators have now authorized cross-retaliation in
three cases.63  The arbitrators have developed a shared vocabulary
concerning DSU Article 22.3 and it thus appears they agree on the
legal standard for when states may cross-retaliate.  This section ar-
gues, however, that when the facts of these cases are examined, the
most recent interpretation of DSU Article 22.3 in U.S. — Cotton repre-
sents a significant relaxation of cross-retaliation, one that is too liberal
in light of the size and diversity of Brazil’s trade with the United
States.  A greater emphasis on the level of trade between the victim
and violating state is consistent with the DSU text and broader pur-
pose of the DSU to both enable and constrain retaliation under the
WTO.
The DSU constrains retaliation in two broad ways: first by lim-
iting compensation to the “equivalent” of the ongoing harm and second
by restraining the use of cross-retaliation according to the procedures
in DSU Article 22.3.64  This section only discusses the latter.
When states seek cross-retaliation, the WTO arbitrator looks to
“ ‘whether the complaining party in question has considered the neces-
sary facts objectively’ and also ‘whether, on the basis of these facts, it
under DSU Article 22.3) and the right to seek remedies for past harm (impermissi-
ble under DSU Article 22.8).  Compare ILC Draft Article, supra 58, art. 31, with id,
art. 49.
62 DSU, supra note 7, art 22.8 (“[t]he suspension of concessions or other obliga-
tions. . .shall only be applied until such time as the measure found to be inconsis-
tent with a covered agreement has been removed . . ”); U.S. — Cotton, supra note
1, ¶ 3.62 (holding that Brazil may not retaliate for U.S. laws found to violate WTO
obligations but subsequently removed, even where Brazil alleged similar mea-
sures were subsequently re-enacted).
63 See generally U.S. – Cotton, supra note 1; U.S. – Gambling, supra note 6; E.C. –
Bananas, supra note 6.
64 See Sebastian, supra note 33, at 348–49 (describing the DSU limits on retalia-
tion as primarily those precluding collective retaliation and limiting cross-retalia-
tion).  The cross-retaliation analysis is analyzed separately from determining the
level of damages, see U.S. — Cotton, supra note 1, ¶¶ 5.24–26.
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could plausibly arrive at the conclusion that it was not practicable or
effective’” to retaliate within the same agreement.65  If retaliation
within the same agreement is either ineffective or impractical, the
WTO authorizes cross-retaliation.66  This has lead to a consensus in
defining “practicable” as “feasible” with reference to the harm such
measures may impose on the retaliating country67 and “effective” as
able to increase “the likelihood of compliance” after the retaliation is
imposed.68
DSU Article 22.3(d) clarifies the “practicability” and “effective-
ness” analysis by requiring consideration of general economic fac-
tors.69  Whether cross-retaliation is permissible under WTO decisions
depends on (i) the size and diversity of trade with the violating state70
and (ii) the size of the complaining state’s economy and disparity in
economic power between it and the violating state.71  This paper ar-
gues arbitrators should place greater emphasis on these textual com-
mands rather than the broader purpose of inducing compliance.
The three cross-retaliation cases represent a spectrum of in-
stances relaxing the DSU Article 22.3 legal standard.  The least con-
troversial authorization of cross-retaliation is in U.S. — Gambling
65 U.S. — Cotton, supra note 1, ¶ 5.51 (quoting E.C. — Bananas, supra note 6, ¶
52).
66 U.S. — Cotton, supra note 1, ¶ 5.70; U.S. — Gambling, supra note 6, ¶ 4.29–30;
E.C. — Bananas, supra note 6, ¶ 74.
67 U.S. — Cotton, supra note 1, ¶ 5.73; U.S. — Gambling, supra note 6, ¶ 4.29;
E.C. — Bananas, supra note 6, ¶ 74.
68 U.S. — Cotton, supra note 1, ¶ 5.81; see U.S. — Gambling, supra note 6, ¶¶
4.29–30; E.C. — Bananas, supra note 6, ¶ 72.
69 DSU, supra note 7, art. 22.3(d)(ii).
70 This analysis is dictated by DSU Article 22.3(d)(i) and arbitrators have univer-
sally considered it,  DSU, supra note 7, art. 223(d)(1); see U.S. — Cotton, supra
note 1, ¶¶ 5.111–41 (detailing the size and diversity of the Brazilian economy and
trade between Brazil and the United States); U.S. — Gambling, supra note 6, ¶¶
4.93–100 (discussing size and nature of service trade between Antigua and the
United States); E.C. — Bananas, supra note 6, ¶¶ 87–120 (discussing size and
nature of trade in goods and services).
71 This analysis is mandated by the terms of DSU Article 22.3(d)(ii) which re-
quires consideration of “the broader economic elements related to the nullification
or impairment and the broader economic consequences of the suspension of conces-
sions or other obligations,” DSU, supra note 7, art. 22.3(d)(ii); see U.S. — Cotton,
supra note 1, ¶ 5.139 (expressly holding that size disparity between the countries
alone does not make suspension within the agreement ineffective or impractica-
ble); U.S. — Gambling, supra note 6, ¶¶ 4.89–92 (recognizing this as a valid con-
sideration, but noting it must be tied to practicability and effectiveness); E.C. —
Bananas, supra note 6, ¶ 73 (stating that where a “great imbalance” exists, the
arbitrator should primarily consider only practicability, or “least harmful” retalia-
tions, in deciding whether cross-retaliation is permissible).
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where the arbitrator authorized Antigua to cross-retaliate against the
United States for obligations breached under GATS.72  The total trade
in services between Antigua and the United States was $102 million.73
The arbitrator concluded that it would not be practicable or effective
for Antigua to retaliate within GATS because Antigua’s trade under
GATS with the United States was confined to transportation, insur-
ance and tourism—sectors where retaliation would “entail a negative
impact for the Antiguan local economy.”74  Antigua had few retaliatory
options and the arbitrator accordingly authorized cross-retaliation.75
Next, along the spectrum is E.C. — Bananas’ less-relaxed read-
ing of DSU Article 22.3.  In E.C. — Bananas, Ecuador imported some-
where between $60.8 and $194 million in consumer goods and $198
million in services from the E.C.76 E.C. — Bananas held that it was
practicable and effective for Ecuador to retaliate against at least some
of the consumer goods under the GATT but was not practicable or ef-
fective to do so against services under the GATS,77 and thus permitted
cross-retaliation.78  Under the GATT, the arbitrator emphasized that
while the retaliation on consumer goods may impose costs, Ecuador
failed to show there were no alternatives available to importing E.C.
goods and, therefore, could retaliate against at least some of those
goods.79  Under the GATS, retaliation against non-wholesale services
imported would undermine foreign investment and cross border ser-
72 U.S. — Gambling, supra note 6, ¶¶ 4.117–19.  The arbitrator first held that
there could be no retaliation within the same sector because Antigua had almost
no trade with the U.S. within the service sector in question, see id. ¶¶ 4.55–60. The
arbitrator then considered retaliation within all GATS sectors and held any GATS
retaliation would be impracticable and ineffective as well, id. ¶ 4.99.
73 Id. ¶ 4.82.
74 Id. ¶ 4.98.
75 Id.
76 E.C. — Bananas, supra note 6, ¶¶ 97–98, 119.
77 Ecuador sought to retaliate against E.C. “wholesale trade services” under
GATS. Id. at ¶ 61.  Because this service trade is in the same sector as the obliga-
tions violated by the E.C., the arbitrator did not make any findings about whether
retaliation against such services were effective or practicable, but simply author-
ized such retaliation under DSU Article 22.3(a). See id. at 62–64.
78 Id. ¶¶ 101, 120.  The arbitrator held that “Ecuador’s nullification and impair-
ment” was $201.6 million per year, id. ¶ 170.  The arbitrator did not say how much
of the consumer goods Ecuador must retaliate against before resorting to cross
retaliation, but because the damages exceeded the total number of goods, it had to
decide the cross-retaliation issue under GATS to afford Ecuador a remedy equal to
its damages, id. ¶ 173(d).
79 Id. ¶ 100.  The U.S. — Cotton arbitrator explicitly rejected E.C. — Bananas in
this interpretation and rejected requiring the victim state to show alternative sup-
plies were available to demonstrate it was the “ ‘least harmful’” mode of retalia-
tion, U.S. — Cotton, supra note 1, ¶ 5.78.
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vices, hurting the fragile Ecuadorian economy.80  The United States
later pointed to E.C. — Bananas case as establishing “bookends” on
the DSU Article 22.3 practicable and effective standard.81  Under this
reading, the E.C. — Bananas and U.S. — Gambling cases stand for
the proposition that cross-retaliation is rarely necessary; only where
the retaliating country has very small amounts of trade under the
agreement is it impracticable and ineffective to retaliate within the
same agreement. E.C. — Bananas and U.S. — Gambling are consis-
tent with one another in that they allowed cross-retaliation, but only
where there was a very limited number of cross-border transactions
within the agreement where the breach occurred.
U.S. — Cotton rejected this understanding and provided the
most relaxed interpretation of DSU Article 22.3 of the three cases.
The arbitrator found that Brazil imported at least $1.27 billion in con-
sumer goods from the United States.82  The arbitrator then held that
of those consumer goods, only food, arms, medical products and “other”
goods are practicable and effective to retaliate against under DSU Ar-
ticle 22.3.83  The arbitrator in U.S. — Cotton held that twenty percent
of those consumer goods were practicable and effective to retaliate
against, totaling $409.7 million of goods Brazil must retaliate against
before cross-retaliating in other agreements.84
The U.S. — Cotton case departs from the previous readings of
DSU Article 22.3 in two ways: (1) the arbitrator in U.S.—Cotton calcu-
lated a precise level of goods that were practicable and effective for
Brazil to retaliate against; and (2) the arbitrator in U.S. — Cotton
found that it was impracticable or ineffective for Brazil, a large and
diverse economy relative to Ecuador and Antigua, to retaliate solely
within the GATT.85  Concerning the first difference, this significantly
limits Brazil’s ability to cross-retaliate because the damages must, at
80 E.C. — Bananas, supra note 6, ¶¶ 108–20.
81 U.S. Submission to the Arbitrator, supra note 41, ¶ 333.
82 U.S. — Cotton, supra note 1, ¶ 5.144 (assuming this figure, Brazil’s estimate, is
correct).  Both the U.S. — Cotton and E.C. — Bananas cases eliminated trade in
capital or industrial goods from those where it could be practicable and effective to
retaliate against, id. ¶ 5.149; E.C. — Bananas, supra note 6, ¶ 91.
83 U.S. — Cotton, supra note 1, ¶¶ 5.166–78.
84 Id. ¶¶ 5.181–83, tbl. 4.  This figure also rejects as practicable or effective retali-
ation against food, pharmaceuticals and arms where U.S. market share exceeded
twenty percent of Brazil’s imports, id. ¶ 5.182.
85 The arbitrator in E.C. — Bananas did not calculate how much of the trade
under GATT was practicable and effective for the E.C. to retaliate against, see E.C.
— Bananas, supra note 6, ¶ 173 (stating that the E.C. may retaliate under TRIPS
if an undefined level of goods where it was both practicable and effective to retali-
ate was less than its level of damages, set at $201.6 million).
\\server05\productn\R\RGL\9-2\RGL201.txt unknown Seq: 16 16-APR-10 10:36
150 RICHMOND JOURNAL OF GLOBAL LAW & BUSINESS [Vol. 9:2
some future date, exceed $409.7 million.86  The E.C. — Bananas arbi-
trator, in contrast, required some retaliation against consumer goods
before resorting to cross-retaliation, although it was unclear how much
relation was necessary.87  Nonetheless, the second finding signifi-
cantly relaxed DSU Article 22.3 relative to previous decisions because
cross-retaliation had not been approved where large volumes of com-
merce occurred from the violating state under the agreement
breached.88
A comparison89 between the cases is straightforward because
the violating members in all three cases are the United States and the
E.C., which are among the largest trade economies in the world.90
However, the economic factors relevant to the DSU Article 22.3 analy-
sis show that the victim states differed in important ways.  For exam-
ple: Brazil’s economy is almost thirty-two times larger than Ecuador’s
economy.91  Brazil’s imports of American consumer goods were be-
86 U.S. — Cotton, supra note 1, ¶ 5.183.
87 Compare id. (holding Brazil was required to retaliate against $409.7 million of
consumer goods under GATT prior to cross-retaliating) with E.C. — Bananas,
supra note 6, ¶¶ 97–101, 173(d) (holding Ecuador could cross-retaliate “[t]o the
extent. . .[retaliation under GATT] is insufficient” but never specifying the precise
level of consumer goods that Ecuador must retaliate against before cross-
retaliating).
88 Compare U.S. — Cotton, supra note 1, at ¶ 5.144 (noting $1.27 billion in U.S.
exports of consumer goods to Brazil) with E.C. — Bananas, supra note 6, at ¶¶
97–99 (noting somewhere between $60.8 and 194 million in E.C. exports of con-
sumer goods to Ecuador); U.S. — Gambling, supra note 6 at ¶ 4.82 (noting $101.8
million in U.S. exports of services to Antigua).  By volume of trade, the U.S. —
Cotton decision seems to be a significant relaxation of the DSU Article 22.3 stan-
dard.  The arbitrators’ view that only consumer goods should be practicable and
effective to retaliate against has been criticized as “mercantilist.” See Mavroidis,
supra note 52, at 806.
89 It is worth noting the SCM Agreement provides for “appropriate countermea-
sures,” for prohibited subsidies, see SCM Agreement, supra note 2, art. 4.10, and
retaliation “commensurate with the degree and nature of the adverse effects” of
actionable subsidies, see SCM Agreement, supra note 2, art. 7.9, while the DSU
provides for only retaliation that is “equivalent to the level of the nullification or
impairment,” DSU, supra note 7, art. 22.4.  The arbitrator in U.S. — Cotton held
that the two standards provide for different levels of countermeasures, while the
cross-retaliation procedures in 22.3 remained applicable under the SCM Agree-
ment, U.S. — Cotton, supra note 1,  ¶¶ 5.24–27.
90 See WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, INTERNATIONAL TRADE STATISTICS 2009, at 13
(2009), available at http://www.wto.org/english/res_e/statis_e/its2009_e/its2009_e.
pdf (listing the United States as the largest importer and third largest exporter
and the European Union as the largest exporter and second largest importer).
91 U.N. Conference on Trade and Development, Developing Countries in Interna-
tional Trade 2007: Trade and Development Index, at 76, 94, UNCTAD/DITC/TAB/
2007/2 (Nov. 6, 2007), available at http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/ditctab20072_
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tween six and twenty-one times larger than Ecuador’s from the E.U.92
Brazil’s share of global export in goods and services is 1.66% while Ec-
uador’s is only .13%.93  Further, the diversity of Brazil’s trade com-
pared to that of Ecuador reveals that Ecuador’s economy is
significantly less diverse and more vulnerable to trade shocks than
Brazil’s economy.94  These basic economic figures show a relaxation of
the DSU Article 22.3 standard.
U.S. — Cotton misreads DSU Article 22.3 by focusing on induc-
ing compliance to the detriment of economic factors listed in the treaty
text.  In assessing whether cross-retaliation is practicable or effective,
the DSU lists weighing the “broader economic consequences” to the
victim state of requiring retaliation in lieu of cross-retaliation.95  The
treaty text also focuses on the “trade. . .and the importance of such
trade” to the victim state as well as “the broader economic elements”
implicated by the violation.96  Brazil had sufficient retaliatory options
given its $18.7 billion in imports of U.S. goods, including $1.27 billion
in consumer goods imports,97 that the arbitrator should have confined
retaliation to GATT instead of allowing cross-retaliation.  Brazil’s eco-
nomic diversity and trade with the United States are simply too great
to allow retaliation outside of GATT.98
Interpreting DSU 22.3 as creating what might be termed a
level of trade standard99 gives fuller meaning to the treaty text100
en.pdf [hereinafter U.N. TDI]. See generally id. (listing GDPs in individual coun-
try profiles).
92 See U.S. — Cotton, supra note 1, ¶ 5.144; E.C. — Banana, supra note 6, ¶¶
97–99.
93 U.N. TDI, supra note 91, at 76, 94 (listing individual country profiles).
94 Id.  For example, Brazil’s trade performance index, which takes into considera-
tion the country’s share of trade in merchandise and services, the market concen-
tration of its merchandise exports and the ration of exports to its GDP, id. at 9,
scores considerably higher (102) than Ecuador (66), id. at 76, 94.  Also, one study’s
attempt to create a composite index to assess vulnerability of developing countries
for purposes of special treatment under trade law concludes that Brazil, because of
its economic size and diverse basket of goods and services traded, would not merit
special consideration while both Ecuador and Antigua would, see generally Fen-
May Liou & Cherng G. Ding, Positioning the Non-Least-Developed Developing
Countries Based on Vulnerability-Related Indicators, 16 J. INT’L. DEV. 751,
751–67.  The vulnerability assessment seems particularly relevant under DSU Ar-
ticle 22.3 because it should be strongly suggestive of the amount of goods where it
is practicable to retaliate against.
95 Id. art. 22.3(d)(ii).
96 DSU, supra note 7, art. 22.3(d)(i)–(ii).
97 U.S. — Cotton, supra note 1, ¶ 5.144.
98 See supra, notes 91–94 and accompanying text.
99 WTO arbitrators have weighed level of trade  in these cases, see e.g. E.C. —
Bananas, ¶ 125–26, although the disparity in the level of trade between the victim
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while remaining true to the object and purpose of the DSU to both
enable and constrain retaliation under the WTO.101  Economic data
suggests that the E.C. — Bananas and U.S. — Gambling decisions
were appropriate under such a standard, while U.S. — Cotton departs
from this principle.102  At some point, the DSU Article 22.3 limit on
cross-retaliation must take priority over the goal of inducing compli-
ance in order to give the legal standard a meaningful effect and the
U.S. — Cotton case should have represented this point.
The DSU text and its context, as well as the DSU’s object and
purpose and the historical setting against which the text of DSU Arti-
cle 22.3 was created suggest that the U.S. — Cotton interpretation of
cross-retaliation distorts the legal standard.  The next section ad-
dresses whether cross-retaliation would have been likely to change the
U.S. reaction to the case.
IV. THE LIMITED UTILITY OF CROSS-RETALIATION
This Part explores the U.S. response to the U.S. — Cotton case.
As discussed below, the U.S. — Cotton case is particularly insightful
because the domestic laws held illegal by the WTO, four different farm
programs, varied in the amount of political pain required to comply
with the rulings.103  The United States ignored some parts of the rul-
ing104 while making substantive legal changes to conform to other
parts of the ruling.105  The U.S. response demonstrates a desire to
comply with its WTO obligations, but only where it could do so without
changing fundamental policy choices.106  The U.S. response suggests
that the prime considerations of policy makers had little to do with the
threat of retaliation under the WTO.107  In short, this section argues
that the prospect of cross-retaliation likely would not have changed
Congress’ or the executive’s reaction to the U.S. — Cotton case.  Fi-
nally, this Part argues there are strong theoretical reasons to believe
that retaliation, more generally, will often fail to induce compliance.108
states in U.S. — Cotton and both E.C. — Bananas  and U.S. — Gambling shows
the U.S. — Cotton Arbitrator significantly moved away from looking at the level of
trade. See supra, notes 87–92 and accompanying text.
100 Cf. DSU, supra note 7, art 22.3 (a)–(d).
101 See supra Part II.
102 See supra, notes 87–92 and accompanying text discussing economic data from
the cases.
103 See infra, Part IV.A.
104 See infra, notes 116–17 and accompanying text.
105 See infra, notes 104–15 and accompanying text.
106 See infra, Part IV.A.1 & 2.
107 See infra, Part IV.A & B.
108 See infra, Part IV.B.
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A. The American Response to the WTO Cotton Case
The programs at issue in U.S. — Cotton ranged from those that
could be changed by executive fiat (export credit guarantees), those
requiring Congressional approval but only affecting cotton producers
(step-2 payments) and two generally applicable programs whose
change would require far-reaching effects on American farm policy
(countercyclical (“CC”) and marketing loans (“ML”) payments).  Unsur-
prisingly, the U.S. response varied accordingly.
The WTO’s ruling that various subsidies to U.S. cotton produc-
ers violated the SCM Agreement produced three distinct responses in
the American polity.  First, the Bush Administration changed export
credit guarantees to make them more subject to market conditions.109
By making the fees subject to market conditions, the Bush Adminis-
tration believed the United States no longer conferred a benefit on
U.S. producers and would therefore no longer constitute a “subsidy”110
within meaning of the SCM Agreement.  The U.S. Trade Representa-
tive (“USTR”) later argued that the United States effectively withdrew
the illegal subsidies because they are market-based and operated at
no-net cost to the government.111  While these changes were later ap-
proved by Congress112 with slightly more extensive statutory changes
to the export credit guarantees,113 the programs were initially
changed through legal discretion already available to the Department
109 See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Agric., USDA Announces Changes to Export
Credit Guarantee Programs to Comply with WTO Findings (June 30, 2005); U.S.
Submission to the Arbitrator, supra note 41, ¶ 31, n.30 (summarizing changes to
the export credit guarantee programs).  The U.S. Department of Agriculture an-
nounced they would no longer accept applications for long-term export subsidies
(GSM-103) and the Supplier Credit Guarantee Program (SCGP), that they had
changed the fee structure of shorter-term export credit guarantees (GSM-102) and
would change eligibility requirements for the loans based on the financial risk
posed by guarantees to various countries, USDA Press Release, supra.
110 See SCM Agreement, supra note 2, art. 1 (defining subsidy); id. at annex I(j)
(providing an “illustrative list of export subsidies.” which includes export credits
“at premium rates which are inadequate to cover the long-term operating costs
and losses of the programs.”).
111 See Written Submission of the United States, United States — Subsidies on
Upland Cotton: Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU by Brazil, ¶¶ 75–128, WT/
DS267/AB-2008-2 (Feb. 19, 2008), available at http://www.ustr.gov/webfm_send/
594.
112 Food, Conservation, and Energy Act of 2008, § 3101, Pub. L. No. 110–246, 122
Stat. 1651 [hereinafter 2008 Farm Bill] (describing codification of executive
changes and also lifting caps on fees for the program).
113 See H.R. REP. NO. 110–256, at 222 (2007); see also 2008 Farm Bill, §3101 (re-
quiring a risk-based assessment of export credit guarantees).
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of Agriculture (“USDA”).114  The Bush Administration changed the ex-
port credit guarantees prior to the deadline set by the WTO for
compliance.115
Second, Congress eliminated the Step-2 program.116  The Step-
2 program provided payments to purchasers of cotton to make-up the
difference between more-expensive U.S. cotton and the international
price of cotton, thereby encouraging its use by domestic mills and in-
ternational buyers.117  Congress eliminated Step-2 in the context of a
series of budget cuts trimming spending on other programs, but Step-2
was the only USDA program eliminated in those cuts.118  The Agricul-
ture Committees in Congress eliminated Step-2 as part of broader cuts
to agriculture programs mandated by the less farm-friendly Budget
Committees under Congressional budget rules.119  In this context,
Step-2 was eliminated because it allowed the Bush Administration
and Congress to assert their intent to comply with WTO rulings,120
while helping the Agriculture Committees meet their targets for
spending cuts.
114 See 7 USC § 5622(a)–(c) (2005) (amended 2008) (providing USDA discretion in
structuring the export credit guarantees with certain limitations).  The older ver-
sion of 7 USC § 5622 (b) & (c) have been replaced by the farm bill provisions en-
acted in 2008. See H.R.  REP. NO. 110–627, at 757–59 (2008) (Conf. Rep.)
(discussing changes to the program).
115 See Sophie Walker & Charles Abbott, U.S. Tweaks Credits for WTO, Key Cot-
ton Aid Untouched, REUTERS, July 1, 2005 (noting the changes were “announced
less than two hours before the deadline to act”).
116 Deficit Reduction Act of 2005 § 1103, 7 U.S.C. § 7937 [hereinafter 2005 Budget
Reconciliation]; see also Congress Approves Legislation Repealing Cotton Subsidy
Program, FARM FUTURES, Feb. 2, 2006, http://farmfutures.com/story.aspx?s=27649
&c=17.
117 RANDY SCHNEPF, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICES, BRAZIL’S WTO CASE
AGAINST THE U.S. COTTON PROGRAM, at 8 (Mar. 17, 2009), available at http://www.
nationalaglawcenter.org/assets/crs/RL32571.pdf.
118 See H.R. REP. NO. 109–362, at 187–94 (2005) (Conf. Rep.) (describing the cuts
to USDA programs). See generally 2005 Budget Reconciliation, supra note 116.
119 See H.R. REP. NO. 109–362.  This process is called budget reconciliation and
allows budget committees to “instruct” authorizing committees to make changes to
mandatory spending programs, see ROBERT KEITH, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH
SERVICE, BUDGET RECONCILIATION LEGISLATION IN 2005, at 1–5, (Nov. 1, 2005),
available at http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/57222.pdf (providing an
overview of budget reconciliation and recent Congressional use of budget
reconciliation).
120 See H.R. REP. NO. 109–276, at 7 (2005) (citing the U.S. — Cotton case as the
impetus for eliminating Step-2); S. REP. NO. 110–220, at 30 (2007) (“[a]spects of
U.S. export credit programs were successfully challenged in the 2005 WTO Brazil
cotton case, and thus must be modified to bring the United States into compliance
with the panel’s rulings in this case”).
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Third, Congress did nothing concerning the CC and ML pay-
ments found to cause “serious prejudice” to Brazil in violation of the
SCM and Agriculture Agreements.121  Those programs were extended
through the 2008 Farm Bill and the arbitrator in U.S. — Cotton noted
that when viewed side-by-side, both the ML and CC programs were
identical and contained only minor changes not relevant to their legal-
ity under the WTO.122  The 2008 Farm Bill actually expands CC pay-
ments by giving farmers a new contract option in addition to those
found illegal under the SCM.123
What explains these different outcomes in response to the
WTO ruling?
1. Changes in Programs Were Driven by a Desire to Comply With
the WTO Rulings
The changes to export credit guarantees and elimination of
Step-2 are best seen as reflecting a desire by the United States to com-
ply with its WTO obligations.  One explanation is that the United
States never sought to comply with the rulings but wanted give the
appearance of compliance while avoiding substantive changes.124
Some evidence suggests that U.S. policy makers had no intent to com-
ply with the rulings.  First, the export credit guarantees, as found later
by the WTO, were not in fact substantively changed but continued to
121 SCHNEPF supra note 117, at 23–24.  Congress reauthorized CC and ML pay-
ments as part of the 2008 Farm Bill, with minor changes, see 2008 Farm Bill,
supra note 112, title I.  It also authorized a new form of CC payments, see H.R.
REP. NO. 110–627, at 676–77 (2008) (Conf. Rep.) (describing a new CC contract
option for commodity producers).
122 See U.S. — Cotton, supra note 1, ¶¶ 3.21–29.  The United States asserted, and
the arbitrator rejected, the seemingly frivolous argument that because the 2002
farm bill had legally “expired” and been replaced by the 2008 farm bill, the mea-
sures no longer existed,  U.S. Submission to the Arbitrator, supra note 41, at
77–79.  Neither Congress nor USTR assert that changes to the ML and CC pay-
ments bring the United States into compliance with the ruling, see U.S. Submis-
sion to the Arbitrator, supra note 41, at 77–79 (explaining that the USTR defense
was based on calculation of damages rather than program changes). See also
Press Release, Senator Chambliss Statement on WTO Decision Against U.S. Cot-
ton (Aug. 31, 2009) (defending the ML and CC payments as lawful because of de-
clining global market share of U.S. cotton exports); cf. S. REP. NO. 110–220, at
90–91 (making a passing reference to Congressional changes to ML and CC pay-
ments in asserting U.S. compliance with the WTO rulings).
123 See 2008 Farm Bill, supra note 112, § 1105; see also, DAN MORGAN, THE FARM
BILL AND BEYOND 53 (German Marshall Fund of the United States, Jan. 2010)
(quoting a source as saying the new program is a “time bomb” under WTO rules for
the United States).
124 See Mavroidis, supra note 52, at 794 (describing how the WTO DSU proce-
dures allow for states to behave in bad faith following DSU rulings against them).
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function as export subsidies.125  Also, given the wide variety of domes-
tic payment support for cotton producers, including ML and CC pay-
ments, elimination of the Step-2 program may seem insignificant.126
Additionally, the United States enacted measures in the 2008 Farm
Bill that appear similar to the WTO-illegal Step-2 program and give a
four cent per pound subsidy to users of cotton.127  Finally, key policy
makers asserted that the United States would continue prohibited cot-
ton subsidies regardless of WTO obligations to the contrary.128
Asserting that the United States had no intent to comply, how-
ever, ignores that there has been some substantive change to U.S.
farm policy that would not have taken place absent the WTO rulings.
Congress’ elimination of the Step-2 program removed an expected
$282 million in payments to purchasers of American cotton.129  The
changes to the export credit guarantees removed access to long-term
guarantees on export financing and changed the users fees associated
with those programs.130  Both the Bush Administration and Congress
were eager to demonstrate their commitment to making changes in
light of the ruling.  Bush Administrations officials consistently stated
their intent to comply131 and, while Congress gave mixed signals, key
Congressional committees have asserted U.S. compliance with the rul-
ings based on these changes.132  Further, the timing and selection of
125 See Appellate Body Report, United States — Subsidies on Upland Cotton Re-
course to Article 21.5 of the DSU by Brazil, WT/DS267/AB/RW (June 2, 2008).
126 See Michael J. Shumaker, Comment, Tearing the Fabric of the World Trade
Organization: United States - Subsidies on Upland Cotton, 32 N.C. J. INT’L L. &
COM. REG. 547, 552–60 (2007) (summarizing USDA’s cotton subsidies).
127 See 2008 Farm Bill, supra note 112, § 1207(c) (establishing a new subsidy for
users of cotton without regard to whether the cotton is domestic or foreign
sourced); see also SCHNEPF supra note 117, at 24 (noting that the “United States
imports very little cotton,” likely creating a de facto subsidy for U.S. cotton grow-
ers).  Interestingly, the arbitrator in U.S. — Cotton refused to consider these mea-
sures as actionable, U.S. — Cotton, supra note 1, ¶ 3.62.  This suggests the
possibility for repeated violations of the WTO, where measures are revoked prior
to punishment, and then re-enacted, making them immune from WTO sanctions.
128 See Charles Abbott, Keep U.S. Cotton Subsidy as Long as Possible - Senator,
REUTERS, Sept. 8, 2005.
129 H.R. REP. NO. 109–276, at 7 (2005).
130 See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Agric., USDA Announces Changes to Export
Credit Guarantee Programs to Comply with WTO Findings (June 30, 2005).
131 See Walker & Abbott, supra note 115 (quoting Secretary of Agriculture Mike
Johanns who stated that “[w]e’re going to comply with the WTO ruling”); see also
Charles Abbott & Sophie Walker, U.S. Plans End of Cotton Subsidy Outlawed by
WTO, REUTERS, July 1, 2005 (quoting USDA Undersecretary J.B. Penn who stated
“[w]e think this package. . .will bring us into compliance”).
132 See S. REP. NO. 110–220, at 90–91 (2007) (asserting that elimination of Step-2,
the changes to the export credit guarantees and that the minor changes in the ML
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the programs for changes or elimination strongly suggests the United
States sought to comply with portions of the WTO rulings.133
The changes are also attributable to the different legal status
of the payments under WTO law.  The SCM Agreement distinguishes
between “prohibited” export and domestic content subsidies,134 and
“actionable subsidies” that are only illegal if they are shown to have
“adverse effects” on other members.135  The Step-2 and export credit
guarantee payments were deemed by the WTO to be prohibited export
subsidies136 while the ML and CC payments were found to be illegal
actionable subsidies because they depressed global markets.137  The
U.S. inaction on ML and CC payments may be a product of the legal
ambiguity concerning actionable subsidies, compared to the straight-
forward prohibition against export subsidies, thus prompting changes
to the latter.  Additionally, the SCM Agreement imposes shorter time-
lines for removing prohibited subsidies.138
In short, the best explanation for the changes to export credit
guarantees and elimination of Step-2 is a desire to comply with the
WTO rulings and prevent continued violations of U.S. trade commit-
ments.  While this helps explain the elimination of Step-2 and changes
to the export credit guarantees, it fails to explain why the WTO rul-
ings failed to induce compliance with the ruling that the CC and ML
payments were also illegal under the WTO.
and CC payments “as a whole constitute sufficient and adequate compliance by
the United States in the [U.S. — Cotton] dispute.  It is the view of the Committee
that no other changes should be necessary to satisfy a compliance panel in the
WTO”); see also H.R.  REP. NO. 110–627, at 758 (2008) (Conf. Rep.) (“the
[m]anagers believe that the changes in this section satisfy U.S. commitments to
comply with the Brazil cotton case with regard to the export credit guarantees.”).
133 That Step-2 was the only program eliminated in Budget Reconciliation sug-
gests the timing and choice was driven by WTO concerns, see H.R. REP. NO.
109–362, at 187–94 (2005) (Conf. Rep.) (describing the cuts to USDA programs).
134 See SCM Agreement, supra note 2, art. 3.
135 See id. art. 5.
136 See U.S. — Cotton, supra note 1, ¶ 1.2 (discussing the previous Appellate Body
holding that Step-2 and export guarantees were prohibited subsidies within mean-
ing of  SCM Article 3); see also SCM Agreement, supra note 2, art. 3.
137 See U.S. — Cotton, supra note 1, ¶ 1.2 (discussing the previous Appellate Body
holding that ML and CC payments were actionable subsidies creating significant
price suppression within meaning of SCM Article 6.3(c)); see also SCM Agreement,
supra note 2, art. 6.3(c).
138 Compare id. art. 4.7 (removal “without delay” upon finding of prohibited sub-
sidy), with id. art. 4.12 (requiring compliance in half the time as specified under
the DSU for other violations of the SCM Agreement); see also SCHNEPF, supra note
117, at 14–17 (summarizing these timelines in the U.S. — Cotton case and how
changes are mandated to be quicker under the SCM Agreement for prohibited
subsidies).
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2. The U.S. Congress Failed to Change Programs Despite the WTO
Findings Where Doing so Would Require Fundamental Changes
to U.S. Farm Policy
Unlike Step-2, which was cotton-specific, and the export credit
guarantees, which could be changed administratively, ML payments
and CC payments are pillars of U.S. farm policy. The ML payments
regulate sales of commodities, helping stabilize the price farmers re-
ceive for cotton and discouraging slumps in market prices immediately
following harvest.139  The CC payments compensate farmers if market
prices fall below a specified trigger.140  Both programs encourage over-
production of cotton, and because of limited domestic use of cotton, the
exports help cause serious prejudice to Brazil.141  Unlike export credit
guarantees, modifying ML and CC payments could not be done in a
WTO-compliant way without undermining the very purpose they are
designed to serve.
The U.S. — Cotton case threatens numerous farm programs
outside of those supporting cotton.  When the WTO’s initial decision
was made, it came as a shock to many in the agriculture commu-
nity.142  The long-term implications remain undefined, but many view
U.S. — Cotton as opening the door to attack numerous U.S. farm pro-
grams under the WTO.143  American reactions to the most recent U.S.
— Cotton decision reaffirm that Congress intends to ignore the WTO’s
139 See Shumaker, supra note 126, at 555 (describing ML payments); USDA Eco-
nomic Research Service, Farm and Commodity Policy: Program Provisions: Mar-
keting Assistance Loans and Loan Deficiency Payments, available at http://www.
ers.usda.gov/briefing/farmpolicy/malp.htm.
140 See Shumaker, supra note 126, at 555–56 (describing CC payments); USDA
Economic Research Service, Farm and Commodity Policy: Program Provisions:
Counter-Cyclical Payments, available at http://www.ers.usda.gov/Briefing/Farm
Policy/countercyclicalpay.htm.
141 The United States is presently the largest global exporter of cotton.  For a sum-
mary of the U.S. role in global cotton trade, see SCHNEPF supra note 117, at 1–2.
142 See Stephanie Mercier, The WTO and US Agricultural Policy: Intersections
and Consequences, CHOICES, 4th Quarter 2004, at 26 (stating that while the rul-
ing was limited to cotton “it potentially has much broader implications for U.S.
agricultural policy”); see also Darren Hudson, et al, The WTO Cotton Case and US
Domestic Policy, CHOICES, 2d Quarter 2005, at 143 (asserting that the U.S. –
Cotton case may be “an event. . .that portends to reshape agricultural policy”).
143 E.g. Stephen J. Powell and Andrew Schmitz, The Cotton and Sugar Subsidies
Decisions: WTO’s Dispute Settlement System Rebalances the Agreement on Agricul-
ture, 10 DRAKE J. AGRIC. L. 287, 312–15, 330 (identifying, corn, dairy, rice, soy-
beans, and wheat subsidies as “hardly any different” from cotton subsidies and
concluding that U.S. — Cotton has “far reaching” consequences that “pose serious
threats to United States farm policy.”). RANDY SCHNEPF, CONGRESSIONAL RE-
SEARCH SERVICE, BRAZIL AND CANADA’S WTO CASES AGAINST U.S. AGRICULTURAL
SUPPORT (Feb. 1, 2008), available at http://www.ncseonline.org/NLE/CRSreports/
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finding that ML and CC payments are illegal under the SCM Agree-
ment and instead Congressional leaders continue emphasizing the
changes made to Step-2 and export credit guarantees while avoiding
any acknowledgement that CC and ML payments require changes
under the WTO.144  It is far from clear that the calculations of key
legislators from Arkansas, Georgia, Montana or Minnesota would have
been different if a credible threat of cross-retaliation to non-agricul-
ture interests was imminent.145  Acknowledging the illegality of ML
and CC payments under the WTO would call into question much of the
U.S. farm support system extended under the 2008 Farm Bill.146
Members of Congress would be loathe to acknowledge such inconsis-
tency between WTO law and current U.S. farm policy.
That Congress has asserted U.S. compliance with the U.S. —
Cotton case while failing entirely to address actionable subsidies147 is
tantamount to a statement that it will go no further in the dispute,
regardless of the consequences under the WTO.  The U.S. response to
the WTO rulings on cotton programs illustrates, in summary, a desire
to comply, but only where it would not produce significant pain.  Some
legal changes by the United States demonstrate a resolve to comply
with U.S. legal obligations under the WTO, but the U.S. ignored parts
of the WTO rulings calling into question fundamental farm policy
choices.  Given the far-reaching consequences of changing ML and CC
payments, it is doubtful that cross-retaliation would have induced
compliance.
B. Retaliation and Issue Linkage in Resolving Disputes in
International Relations Theory and State Practice
Supporters of retaliation surmise that for developed countries
whose comparative advantage is in services and intellectual property,
08Mar/RL34351.pdf (summarizing cases against U.S. farm programs brought by
Brazil and Canada following the U.S. — Cotton case).
144 See Press Release, Harkin Comments on WTO Decision on Brazil Cotton Case,
(Aug. 31, 2009), available at http://216.40.253.202/~usscanf/index.php?option=
com_content&task=view&id=1943&Itemid=2 (noting other changes in response to
the U.S. – Cotton rule but not addressing ML and CC payments); Press Release,
Senator Chambliss Statement on WTO Decision Against U.S. Cotton (Aug. 31,
2009) (failing to mention ML and CC payments in a summary of U.S. actions to
comply).
145 Cf. DAN MORGAN, supra note 123, at 52–53 (discussing Congressional reaction
to U.S. — Cotton and concluding that lengthy delays for penalties under the DSB
mean lawmakers “can ignore the WTO without serious consequences”).
146 See generally Powell and Schmitz, supra note 143; 2008 Farm Bill, supra note
112.
147 See S. REP. NO. 110–220, at 90–91 (2007) (asserting compliance with the rul-
ings, despite failing to substantively change ML and CC payments).
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linking rights under TRIPS and GATS with obligations under GATT
will significantly increase compliance with the latter.148  This proposi-
tion is questionable as a matter of international relations theory as
well as state practice.  Retaliation changes the calculus of states, but
only to a limited degree.  Instead, compliance is most often driven by
the traditional institutional role in monitoring and clarifying when a
WTO member is in breach, similar to the function of pre-WTO GATT
panels.
Mainstream international relations theory assumes states are
rational actors, but diverges into two broad camps that explain compli-
ance with international obligations as a product of either underlying
power disparities between states (realism)149 or international regimes
that coordinate cooperation between states (institutionalism), usually
in an efficient manner.150  Realists explain patterns of cooperation,
whether or not in an institutional setting, as reflecting underlying in-
ternational power structures.151  Institutionalists emphasize that in-
148 See Andrew S. Bishop, The Second Legal Revolution in International Trade
Law: Ecuador Goes Ape in Banana Trade War with European Union, 12 INT’L LE-
GAL PERSP. 1, 3, 126 (2002) (arguing that the E.C. — Bananas case “effectively
levels the playing field between the weaker developing WTO members and the
stronger industrial WTO members . . . [and] will most likely set a precedent  in-
ducing compliance”); Gabriel L. Slater, The Suspension of Intellectual Property Ob-
ligations Under TRIPS: A Proposal for Retaliating Against Technology-Exporting
Countries in the World Trade Organization, 97 GEO. L.J. 1365, 1370 (2009) (“sus-
pending U.S. and European IP rights offers a powerful stick in their trade with
developed countries.”); see also Georgia Hamann, Note, Replacing Slingshots With
Swords: Implications of the Antigua-Gambling 22.6 Panel Report for Developing
Countries and the World Trading System, 42 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 993, 998
(2009) (stating that TRIPS retaliation “constitutes a grave threat to developed
economies [by]. . .effectively exerting pressure on developed economies to either
honor obligations or pay fair settlement prices”).  Note here that my analysis in
this section applies equally to regular retaliation and cross-retaliation although I
use the term retaliation here.
149 A variant of realism is the theory of hegemonic stability, which posits that the
creation of international regimes, and sometimes institutions, result from the
leading economic power’s ability and willingness to bear the costs of them.  For the
original exposition of this theory in explaining the Great Depression and lack of
international cooperation in monetary affairs, see CHARLES P. KINDLEBERGER, THE
WORLD IN DEPRESSION 1929–39, 1–13 (rev. and enlarged ed. 1986).  This is rele-
vant because it predicts that when major players view the WTO legal regime as
unnecessarily binding them, the multilateral trading system will be undermined.
150 See JOSE´ E. ALVAREZ, INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AS LAW-MAKERS 17–31
(2005) (describing institutionalists as “functionalists” and comparing institutional-
ist theory with realism).
151 See John J. Mearsheimer, The False Promise of International Institutions,
INT’L SECURITY, Winter 1994–95, at 7.
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ternational organizations facilitate information sharing, transparency
and monitoring of compliance with obligations, and reducing but not
eliminating obstacles to cooperation posed by power disparities.152
Explicit in both iterations of mainstream international rela-
tions theory is that states are rational actors with pre-determined
preference schedules.153  The analogy that states act like billiard balls
in international relations suggests that states’ preferences are hard to
alter outside of traditional power politics.154  In the context of the
WTO, the victim state’s ability to alter trade preferences necessarily
confronts disparities in international power155 and the limited legal
capacity conferred on the DSU to change these preferences.156
The DSU’s limitation that retaliation only may be employed by
countries bringing complaints157 also runs contrary to international
relations scholarship examining when sanctions succeed in inducing
compliance.  One of the assumptions of this scholarship is that sanc-
tions are often ineffective and less effective when done without multi-
lateral support.158  This scholarship examines when sanctions succeed
152 See ROBERT O. KEOHANE, AFTER HEGEMONY COOPERATION AND DISCORD IN THE
WORLD POLITICAL ECONOMY 85–109 (1984). See generally Robert O. Keohane &
Lisa L. Martin, The Promise of Institutionalist Theory, 20 INT’L SECURITY 1, 39–51
(1995).
153 See generally KEOHANE, supra note 152, chs. 1, 5–6 (demonstrating how states
as rational actors create institutions to coordinate behavior).
154 See ARNOLD WOLFERS, DISCORD AND COLLABORATION 19–24 (1962) (using the
billiard ball analogy to and noting deviations from that model in international re-
lations before asserting that explaining state behavior requires “primary atten-
tion” to the nation-state and multistate systems).
155 Mavroidis believes that while the WTO does not have a mandate to address
inequalities under all circumstances, they may in the context of the dispute settle-
ment to ensure “inequalities will not adversely affect the rights of states con-
cerned,” Mavroidis, supra note 52, at 808, n.134.  This is true to the extent
permitted under the terms of the DSU, which restricts the size of permissible re-
taliations permitted, see DSU, supra note 7, art. 22.4, and the kind of retaliations
under the “practicable” and “effective” procedures, see DSU, supra note 7, art.
22.3.
156 See DSU, supra note 7, art 22.4 (limiting the size of retaliation to that
“equivalent” to the level impairment due to the violating measure); id. art. 22.3
(limiting the manner of retaliation and when states may resort to cross-retalia-
tion); see generally supra Part II.
157 See DSU, supra note 7, art. 23.1 (“[w]hen Members seek redress of a violation
of obligations. . .they shall have recourse to, and abide by, the rules and proce-
dures of this Understanding”).
158 See Daniel W. Drezner, Bargaining, Enforcement, and Multilateral Sanctions:
When is Cooperation Counterproductive, 54 INT’L ORG. 1, 73–102 (2000) (providing
an explanation for why there has been a lack of empirical support for the assump-
tion that sanctions are only effective when implemented multilaterally); cf. GARY
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in changing political or security goals of states, a considerably tougher
task than changing trade preferences.  Linking compliance with WTO
obligations to the threat of sanctions requires, at the least, that the
suspension carries sufficient market power159 so that it will inflict real
pain on the non-compliant state.160  The DSU limits the amount of
pain that the victim state may apply, and arbitrators have acknowl-
edged that economic disparities between the violating state and the
victim state necessarily limit the ability of retaliations to induce com-
pliance.161  The WTO’s ability to induce compliance strictly through
retaliation is therefore sharply limited.162
CLYDE HUFBAUER, ET AL, PETERSON INSTITUTE FOR INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS, EC-
ONOMIC SANCTIONS RECONSIDERED 158–75 (2007) (finding that sanctions by states
since 1914 were “at least partially successful” 34% of the time, that stronger diplo-
matic ties between the sanctioning state and sanctioned state improve success, but
also that broader multilateral support does not necessarily change this success
rate); James Mayall, The Sanctions Problem in International Economic Relations:
Reflections in the Light of Recent Experience, 60 INT’L AFF. 4, 631–42 (taking a dim
view of sanctions in practice during the Cold War, particularly where diplomacy
cannot ensure multilateral participation in them).
159 If states are rational actors, by analogy, the antitrust concept of “tying” be-
tween two products is instructive of how difficult it will be to induce compliance
through sanctions.  Tying one product to another will not “force” a consumer to buy
the tied product unless the seller has sufficient market power in the tying product,
see Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 12 (1984) (holding that tying
of products is not per se illegal unless there is market power in the tying product
sufficient to force consumers to purchase the tied product).  Here, Brazil cannot
force compliance from the United States (the tied product) unless it has sufficient
market power in some other sector to retaliate (the tying product).  The United
States thus will not change its farm policies unless Brazil can impose large and
painful sanctions.  The analogy is misleading because, unlike consumers in the
market, states have institutionalized an entire spectrum of interactions under the
WTO and are not in fact unitary actors.  This analogy suggests however the rare
instance when retaliation itself will bear sufficient economic power to force compli-
ance from a state determined to resist.
160 Robert E. Hudec, Broadening the Scope of Remedies in the WTO Dispute Settle-
ment, in IMPROVING WTO DISPUTE SETTLEMENT PROCEDURES ISSUES AND LESSONS
FROM THE PRACTICE OF OTHER INTERNATIONAL COURTS AND TRIBUNALS 369, 388
(Friedl Weiss ed. 2000) (“[h]opefully the economic pain caused by the retaliation
will enlist the support of affected economic interests”).
161 See U.S. — Gambling, supra note 6, ¶¶ 4.109–16 (discussing the vulnerability
of Antigua’s economic situation and its relevance in considering the practicability
and effectiveness of suspending obligations within the same sector or agreement).
162 Cf. U.S. Submission to the Arbitrator, supra note 41, ¶ 341 (“[t]he DSU regime
establishes remedies that could potentially be insufficient to lead the government
to comply with the DSB ruling, but this outcome was knowingly considered and
selected by Members when negotiating the DSU”) (emphasis added).
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As an empirical matter, it is impossible to know when a state’s
compliance with a WTO panel is driven by a desire to avoid potentially
painful sanctions or whether it complies because of other factors.163
One study of compliance with GATT panels finds that, unsurprisingly,
the larger economies tended to succeed more and comply less than
weaker states.164 In U.S. — Cotton, it cannot be definitively deter-
mined whether U.S. policy makers were driven to make the changes to
farm programs because of the threat of sanctions or the desire to main-
tain international credibility and improve diplomatic relations, or a
combination of these factors.  There is good reason to think states often
will comply with legal obligations regardless of potential sanctions.
Legal analysts generally agree that WTO panels, appellate
body and arbitrator reports, like the text of the WTO agreements
themselves, create a legal obligation on states not in compliance to
remedy the continuing violation.165  Compliance with international
WTO rulings is, to a large extent, self-enforcing because of the nega-
tive long-term consequences of breach and associated reputation
losses.166  Robert Hudec argues that on the whole, the GATT panels
were quite successful in inducing compliance, despite the absence of
effective economic sanctions.167  This suggests that the WTO’s most
effective tools are traditional institutional functions such as monitor-
163 Cf. ROBERT E. HUDEC, ENFORCING INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW: THE EVOLUTION
OF THE MODERN GATT LEGAL SYSTEM 359 (1990) (“one can never really prove that
an international legal institution has made a difference”).
164 See id. at 355.
165 Mavroidis, supra note 52, at 782; see also; John Jackson, The WTO Dispute
Settlement Understanding—Misunderstandings on the Nature of Legal Obligation,
in DISPUTE RESOLUTION IN THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION 69 (James Cameron
& Karen Campbell eds., 1998); but see Schwartz & Sykes, supra note 31, at §189
(arguing that the WTO members are not obliged to comply with rulings).
166 HUDEC, supra note 163, at 361 (discussing compliance with GATT panels
where no effective sanctions were employed, concluding that “[t]he main impact [of
GATT rulings] comes from a series of events that, on the one hand, communicate
the international community’s condemnation with increasing clarity and author-
ity, and, on the other hand, create repeated occasions upon which the govern-
ment’s policy must be reviewed and may be changed”).
167 Id. at 353 (finding “the overall success rate of 88 percent” for GATT panels); see
Hudec, supra note 160, at 400 (closing a discussion of remedies by saying that
“[t]he ultimate ‘remedy’ which made the GATT dispute settlement procedure as
successful as it was the force of community pressure . . . that can be generated
without an elaborate structure of remedial procedures”).  Compliance with WTO
reports similarly has been strong, see generally Bruce Wilson, Note, Comment and
Development, Compliance by WTO Members With Adverse WTO Dispute Settle-
ment Rulings: The Record to Date, 10 J. INT’L ECON. L. 397 (2007).
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ing state behavior, clarifying legal obligations, and legitimizing retali-
atory actions in the face of a trade partner’s continued breach.168
The question is how significantly increased retaliation, includ-
ing cross-retaliation, adds to the likelihood of compliance with WTO
rulings.169  It cannot be denied that an institutionalized regime of
sanctions may increase compliance over the medium-to-long term, and
possibly induce liberal trade policies in situations where it otherwise
would not occur.170  The improved compliance will likely be marginal,
however,171 and must be considered in light of the associated draw-
backs of increased sanctions.  Countervailing considerations include
distracting from multilateral economic liberalization,172 unleashing
domestic protectionist lobbying in the victim state,173 and enhancing
larger states economic power in the DSU.174  Limiting cross-retalia-
tion to situations where the victim state has little trade with the vio-
lating state will usually prevent DSU Article 22.3 from becoming a tool
of the powerful against the weak because, on the whole, weak states
168 See Kenneth W. Abbott & Duncal Snidal, Why States Act Through Formal In-
ternational Organizations, 42 J. CONFLICT RES. 1, 16–23 (1998) (identifying inde-
pendence as a key reason why states act through formal international
organizations rather than ad hoc legal regimes without such organizations);
Judith Goldstein & Lisa L. Martin, Legalization, Trade Liberalization, and Do-
mestic Politics: A Cautionary Note, 52 INT’L ORG. 3, 603, 608–09 (2000) (noting that
“precision” concerning legal requirements is a key function of trade liberalization).
See generally HUDEC, supra note 163, at 357–72 (assessing why states complied
with GATT panels).
169 Compare HUDEC, supra note 163, at 353 (noting a study finding a compliance
rate of 88 percent under GATT dispute panels), with Judith L. Goldstein & Rich-
ard H. Steinberg, Negotiate or Litigate? Effects of WTO Judicial Delegation on U.S.
Trade Politics, 71 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 257, 275 (noting a study finding a 95
percent compliance rate with WTO rulings as of 2007).
170 See generally Goldstein & Steinberg, supra note 169 (arguing that WTO deci-
sions affect domestic interest in ways that may encourage liberalization not possi-
ble through traditional negotiations).
171 HUDEC, supra note 163, at 363 (assessing increased retaliation “higher costs of
resistance” as unlikely “to have much political impact”).
172 Charnovitz, supra note 14, at 832 (arguing that sanctions may be “distracting
attention from the task of economic liberalization”); Shumaker, supra note 126, at
602 (asserting that the long-term consequences of Brazil’s victory in the WTO is
likely to undermine efforts to reduce barriers to trade).
173 See Charnovitz, supra note 14, at 814–18 (discussing the painful effects on the
imposing state, and noting domestic industry lobbying efforts to have protection
afforded to them through sanctions).
174 HUDEC, supra note 163, at 363 (“higher costs of resistance will be most effec-
tive as a deterrent against non-compliance by those relatively smaller countries”).
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have less trade than larger developed countries.175  Under the stan-
dard proposed here, the opportunity to cross-retaliate usually will re-
main open to small states against larger ones.
The increased limits of the proposed standard often would ben-
efit developing countries while sacrificing only marginal gains in in-
creased compliance with WTO rulings.  The compliance-inducing
benefits of the WTO are unlikely to be significantly enhanced through
more cross-retaliation, although the drawbacks may be substantial.
V. CONCLUSION
While inducing compliance with WTO obligations is a central
tenant of the DSU, it is not the exclusive purpose.  This paper suggests
inducing compliance through retaliation will often be difficult and also
argues that the U.S. — Cotton decision stretches the standard under
the DSU to a legally distorted position.  The U.S. — Cotton case also
shows that a sense of legal obligation spurs change, but only to a point.
When there is significant trade between countries under the agree-
ment breached, there is good reason to think that the compliance in-
ducing effects of the WTO will succeed or fail regardless of the victim
state’s ability to retaliate.  Instead of focusing solely on inducing com-
pliance, WTO arbitrators should look at the level of trade between the
victim and violating state.  This is consistent with the overall purpose
of the DSU to both enable and constrain state retaliation and remains
true to the legal standard established by treaty makers in creating
DSU Article 22.3.
175 Of course, under the proposed standard it could still be used by powerful IP
exporting countries against weak states where the weak state exports no goods or
services protected under TRIPS.  This was the situation envisioned when DSU Ar-
ticle 22.3 was originally proposed, see CROOME, supra note 56, at 112–14, 244,
279–83.
